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ABSTRACT: Digitization, sophisticated fiber-optic networks, and the resultant
convergence of the media, communications and information technology industries
have completely transformed the communications landscape in the last couple of
decades. New contingent business and social models were created that have been
mirrored in the amended communications regimes. Yet, despite an overhaul of the
communications regulation paradigm, the status of, and the rules on universal service
have remained surprisingly intact, both during and after the liberalization exercise.
The present paper looks into this paradox and examines the sustainability of the
existing concept of universal service. It suggests that there is a need for a novel
concept of universal service in the digital networked communications environment,
whose objectives go beyond the conventional internalizing and redistributional
rationales, and concentrate on communication and information networks as a public
good, where not only access to infrastructure but also access to content may be
essential.
Author: Dr. iur., University of Berne. Alternate leader of the Swiss National
Centre of Competence in Research ("NCCR") individual project "eDiversity: The
Legal Protection of Cultural Diversity in a Digital Networked Environment," as well
as a member of the i-call (International Communications and Art Law Lucerne)
research center of the University of Lucerne. The author thanks Susan Kaplan for
her valuable comments.
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
Universal service is a convoluted concept. On one hand, it mayI
seem as simple as the goal of providing a "telephone in every home,"
while, on the other hand, it may be indefinitely complex if construed
in the context of human rights and/or the role of the state. The concept
of universal service may also be a misleading one. Indeed, it is
endowed with different meanings in different contexts, particularly in
the political (if not in the academic) domain. It is used simultaneously
to connote a public policy objective and a public policy instrument for
the achievement of other policy goals. Universal service is not a
concept that exists independently from other concerns. It entails a
number of heterogeneous objectives and, as we shall see below, these
may evolve over time. Moreover, universal service is in constant
(more or less direct) interaction with a plethora of other government
policies and with the actions of state agencies and private parties with
regard to both its formulation and its implementation. The definition
of universal service and its mix of ingredients also vary from sector to
sector and from country to country, although certain common patterns
are discernible.2
This already fuzzy picture is complicated by the fact that universal
service is set in an environment that is in a state of perpetual flux.
This is especially true for the communications sector, which has
undergone radical changes in the last two decades in terms of rapid
technological advances and market developments. Digitization,
sophisticated fiber-optic networks, and the resultant convergence of
the media, communications, and information technology industries
have completely transformed the communications landscape. 3 New
contingent business and social models were created, which have been
mirrored in the amended communications regimes. Yet, despite an
overhaul of the communications regulation paradigm the status of, and
the rules on universal service have remained surprisingly intact both
1 Colin R. Blackman, "Universal Service: Obligation or Opportunity?" Telecommunications
Policy 19, no. 3 (1995): 171.
2 European Commission, "Liberalisation of Network Industries: Economic Implications and
Main Policy Issues," Report of the DGfor Economic and Financial Affairs, no. 4 (Brussels,
1999), 185-188.
1 See, e.g., Christopher T. Marsden, ed., Regulating the Global Information Society
(London/New York: Routledge, 2000).
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during and after the liberalization and reregulation of the
communications markets.
One of the tasks of this paper is to look into this alleged paradox of
why the rules remain static in such a dynamic environment. The
second and core task is to identify the concept of universal service, its
nature, and precise contours beyond "the stuff of myth, [the] slippery
and ideological concept which has been used and manipulated by
different parties to support their own case for special treatment.'A
Based upon observations on previous conceptualizations of universal
service and the developments of communications markets and their
societal repercussions, this paper will draw conclusions on the need
for a novel concept of universal service in a digital networked
communications environment. We shall not delineate the specific
parameters and contents of future universal service policies. Instead,
we propose a readjustment of the debate on the universal service
concept as part of the broader governance discussions on the
appropriate regulatory model(s) for electronic communications.
The paper addresses the above issues in four parts. The first part
outlines with a few broad brushstrokes the stages in the development
of the universal service concept with a focus on the European
Community ("EC") legal framework.' The second part draws upon
this historical background, the current state of the EC universal service
regime, and the proposed changes thereto to elaborate on the nature
and the dynamics of the concept of universal service. Part three of the
paper analyzes the sustainability of this concept and argues the need
for its reformulation. Part four draws conclusions and suggests a new
approach toward universal service issues.
Before proceeding, a few caveats regarding our analysis are
necessary. First, we shall limit our investigation to the concept of
universal service and shall not elaborate on the various present or
future mechanisms for implementing or funding universal service
obligations ("USOs"). 6 Although the question of "how" is critical, we
4 Blackman, "Universal Service," supra note 1, at 171.
5 For a detailed analysis of universal service in the EC context and a comprehensive
comparison between the old and the new regimes, see Paul Nihoul and Peter Rodford, EU
Electronic Communications Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5.01-5.350.
6 For an overview of the implementation and funding approaches, see European Commission,
"Liberalisation of Network Industries," supra note 2, at 178-184. See also Michael Tyler,
William Letwin, and Christopher Roe, "Universal Service and Innovation in
Telecommunication Services," Telecommunications Policy 19, no. 1 (1995): 3-20. Jayakar
and Sawhney present an excellent overview of the different options for designing future
universal services obligations, in particular with regard to the distribution and financing of the
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attempt to answer the "what" and "why" questions. Second, the
analysis is based on the law and practice of universal service of the
European Union ("EU") with occasional reference to developments in
the United States, which essentially means that our perspective will be
confined to that of developed countries. 7 Finally, note that we should
analyze universal service and not the broader concept of public
service. Although related, the two concepts are by no means
synonymous. As we shall see below, they might have had similar
origins, but they also reflect different attitudes of policymakers and
have essentially different contents.
8
II. THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE
A. THE ROOTS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICIES
The concept of universal service has its roots in some almost
notorious developments in the United States at the dawn of the
twentieth century. 9 As the legend goes, it was Theodore Vail, then
Chairman of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
("AT&T"), who convinced the government that a regulated monopoly
with universal service obligations was a better model to adopt than a
system of traffic interexchange among competing networks.'0 Vail
called for the creation of a single, common, uniform, and nationwide
telecommunications network whose services would be available to all
universal service obligations. See Krishna P. Jayakar and Harmeet Sawhney, "Universal
Service: Beyond Established Practice to Possibility Space," Telecommunications Policy 28,
no. 3-4 (2004): 346-349.
7 See, e.g., Farid Gasmi, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and William W. Sharkey, "Competition,
Universal Service and Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries," Information
Economics and Policy 12, no. 3 (2000): 221-248; Xinzhu Zhang, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and
Antonio Estache, "Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries," World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 3421 (2004).
8 European Commission, "Liberalisation of Network Industries," supra note 2, at 168-170.
9 An excellent reference on the development of the US telecommunications system and
universal service is Milton L. Mueller, Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection, and
Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997). See also Milton L. Mueller, "Universal Service in Telephone History: A
Reconstruction," Telecommunications Policy 17, no. 5 (1993): 352-369.
" These networks were locally developed by some 6000 independents across the US after the
expiration of AT&T's telephone patents. The local networks varied in standards and quality
and were (willingly or not) most often incompatible with one another.
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users in all locations." The subsequent adoption of the Willis-Graham
Act in 1921 marked the end of the competitive era in U.S. telecom
markets. By exempting telephone companies from the Sherman Act,
the Willis-Graham Act opened the way to monopoly, which was
supposed to cater for universal service provision. The 1934
Communications Act affirmed the subsidized universal penetration
model. Although it made no explicit reference to universal service as
such, it charged the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
with the task of giving all U.S. citizens a national and global
telecommunications service, provided by AT&T at an affordable
price. 12 Despite the appealing grandeur of this history, it should be
noted that what Vail intended at that time was the creation of a
nationally interconnected and interoperable telephone system, rather
than a service for everyone' 3 as we would construe it today.
In the EC as a supranational entity, the conceptualization of
universal service and the need for formulating a comprehensive policy
in this respect came understandably much later than in the United
States, with the commencement of liberalization of the telecom sector.
Until then, in the landscape of strictly national monopolies, there was
no need for such a policy at the European level. Universal service
obligations did exist but were considered a national matter of the
member states. The pre-liberalization Post, Telegraph, and Telephone("PTT") monopoly model 14 had, as one of its core objectives, and
indeed as its justification, the provision of universal service as part of
1 The campaign launched by Theodore Vail was under the slogan "One Policy, One System,
Universal Service." The original document is available at AT&T, "One Policy, One System,
Universal Service," Advertisement, http://wwwatt.com/history/milestone1908.html
(accessed October 1, 2006).
12 "For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire
and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,
without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges... " See Communications Act of 1934, U.S. Code 47 (2000),§ 151.
" Milton L. Mueller, "Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction," supra note
9.
14 On the P'T model, see Oliver Stehmann, Network Competition for European
Telecommunications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 78-79; see also Damien
Geradin and Michel Kerf, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 6-7.
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the public service. 15  It was widely assumed at the time that state
ownership was sufficient to guarantee PTT action in the public
interest. "[T]he state was seen as a 'stopgap' for tasks that the private
sector could not provide, 16 and the PTTs were viewed accordingly "as
instruments of government policy contributing to macroeconomic and
microeconomic policy goals, including the provision of universal
service.''
17
In reality, most PTTs never came close to providing universal
service in the sense of access to the public telephone network to all
locations. The PTTs' levels of economic efficiency and their
responsiveness to customer needs were poor and in almost all aspects,
the "idealistic theory of public service failed dramatically in
practice."' 8  Similarly, in the United States, while AT&T provided
local telephony below cost through cross-subsidization between long-
distance and local traffic, it did not achieve universal geographical
rollout of its services. In fact, it took until the 1960s for appropriate
levels of penetration to be reached due mostly to a reduction in
connection costs and a vigorous market demand.1
15 Public service is a term usually used to describe services provided by a government to its
citizens, either directly (through the public sector) or by financing private provision of
services. The term is widely associated with the common consensus that certain services
should be available to all, regardless of income. On public service in Europe, see Tony
Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 96-173. For a comparison between public service and universal
service, see Nihoul and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.318-
5.324.
16 Johannes M. Bauer, "Universal Service in the European Union" Government Information
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1999): 332.
'" Ibid.
18 William H. Melody, "Policy Objectives and Models of Regulation," in Telecom Reform:
Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, William H. Melody, ed. (Lyngby: Technical
University of Denmark, 1997), 17.
19 See Paschal Preston and Roderick Flynn, "Rethinking Universal Service: Citizenship,
Consumption Norms and the Telephone," The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 92-93, as
referred to by Seamus Simpson, "Universal Service Issues in Converging Communications
Environments: The Case of the UK," Telecommunications Policy 28, no. 3-4 (2004): 235. See
also Nicholas Gamham, "Universal Service," in Melody, Telecom Reform, supra note 18, at
200.
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B. UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN A POST-LIBERALIZATION ERA
It is now beyond doubt that competition in telecommunications
(both in the sense of opening of markets and privatization of the
telecommunications operator) is beneficial 20 and does not endanger the
provision of universal service. 21  The liberalization of the
telecommunications markets and the related reform of the state
intervention model were, however, not a work of magic following a
sudden neo-liberal realization of the positive effects of market
mechanisms. The transformation of the communications industry was
made possible through "a series of steps, each controversial and
painful '22 and took almost fifteen years to complete. It was driven by
the technological breakthroughs in the telecommunications industry
that can be summarized under the three broad headings of:
(i) digitization; (ii) invention and upgrading of the transistor; and
(iii) perfection of the optical fiber.23 These had a profound impact on
the telecommunications markets and their organization, necessitating
an appropriate regulatory framework.24 In the concrete context of
examining universal service, the liberalization of telecommunications
markets meant that the previously existing public service type of
regulation of the sector needed modification and the contours of USOs
were to be set anew.
20 For examples on the beneficial role of competition, see Stephen Davies, Heather Coles,
Matthew Olczak, Christopher Pike, and Christopher Wilson, "The Benefits from Competition:
Some Illustrative UK Cases," DTI Economics Paper, no. 9 (July 2004). For the benefits of
deregulation in telecommunications, see J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber,
"Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries," Yale Journal on Regulation
15, no. 1 (1998): 117-147.
21 Economic Policy Committee, Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2002,
ECFIN/EPC/1 17/02-EN (Brussels, March 5, 2002). See also Swiss Federal Council,
Botschaft zur Bundesbeteiligung am Unternehmen Swisscom AG, BBI 2006 3763 (April
2006) (Message of the Federal Council on the Federal Participation in the Swisscom
Corporation).
22 Eli M. Noam, Interconnecting the Network ofNetworks (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2001), 1.
23 See Milton L. Mueller, "Digital Convergence and Its Consequences," (1999): 2,
http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/rpl.pdf (accessed October 1, 2006); David Gillies and Roger
Marshall, Telecommunications Law 1, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003), 9.
24 See, e.g., European Commission, Fifth Report on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(99) 537 final, 1999, 5. For a detailed
analysis, see Mira Burri Nenova, EC, Electronic Communications: Can Competition Law Do
It All?, chap. 1 (forthcoming 2007; on file with the author).
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As mentioned above, the EC did not have a clear-cut universal
service policy because the EC deemed the provision of public services
a national matter until the opening of telecommunications to
competition. With the formulation of European telecommunications
policy, however, which commenced with the Green Paper on the
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment25 in 1987, the idea of providing certain "basic
services was taken into consideration.26 The preservation of universal
service at the Community level was indeed an important bargaining
chip, which the European Commission used vis-ii-vis the member
states in order to efficiently implement its ambitious deregulation
plan.2
7
Within the Open Network Provision ("ONP") model, which
provided for asymmetric sectoral rules that assisted the liberalization
of EC telecommunications, 28 universal service was for the first time
regulated at the Community level. It rested on three major principles:
(i) equality, i.e., access must be offered independently of
location to all;
(ii) continuity, i.e., a specified quality29 must be offered all the
time; and
25 European Commission, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications Services and Equipment: Towards a Dynamic European Economy,
COM(87) 290 final, 1987.
26 Ibid., 42. The document did not mention universal service as such, but it discussed the
possibility of maintaining exclusive or special rights with respect to the provider of a limited
number of basic services. It built on previous discussions: see European Commission,
Communication on the Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications
Services Sector, COM(93) 159 final, 1993; European Commission, Developing Universal
Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, COM(93) 543, 1993, 4.
27 On the pro-active role of the European Commission, see, e.g., Herbert Ungerer, "Access
Issues under EU Regulation and Antitrust Law: The Case of Telecommunications and Internet
Markets," (working paper, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, July 2000), 12-13, http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/publications/pdf-
blurb.asp?id=479 (accessed October 1, 2006). For an excellent analysis of the EC
telecommunications regime and its evolution, see Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and
Regulation in European Telecommunications (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart, 2000), 1-36.
28 On the ONP framework, see Larouche, Competition Law, supra note 27, at 25-32.
29 Pursuant to parameters and methodologies specified by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute.
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(iii) affordability, i.e., a certain price level for basic services
affordable for all must be assured.30
Following these principles, Directive 97/33/EC 31  and Directive
98/10/EC 2 identified "universal service" as "a defined minimum set
of services of specified quality which is available to all users
independent of their geographic location and, in the light of specific
national conditions, at an affordable price."33  This "minimum set of
services" included at the time of liberalization: (i) access to the fixed
public telephone network at a fixed location; (ii) access to fixed public
telephone services enabling users to make and receive national and
international calls, supporting speech, facsimile and/or data
communications; (iii) directory services; (iv) public pay phones; and
(v) certain measures for disabled users and users with special social
needs. 34 The implementation of these provisions secured, during the
arguably turbulent and unstable process of liberalization the
availability and affordability of telecommunications services of certain
quality.
30 In the EC context, "affordable price" means a price defined by the member states at national
levels in the light of specific national conditions and may involve setting common tariffs
irrespective of location or special tariff options to deal with the needs of low-income users.
The affordability of telephone service is related to the information, which users receive
regarding telephone usage expenses, as well as the relative cost of telephone usage compared
to other services, and is also related to their ability to control expenditure. Affordability,
therefore, means also giving power to consumers through obligations imposed on
undertakings designated as USOs providers (e.g., a specified level of itemized billing or the
possibility for consumers selectively to block certain calls, such as high-priced calls to
premium services). For details regarding the current EC regime, see Article 9 of Directive
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal
Service and Users' Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
Eur. O.J. L108/51 (April 24, 2002).
31 Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on
Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and
Interoperability through Application of the Principles of the Open Network Provision (ONP),
Eur. O.J. L199/32 (July 26, 1997) (hereinafter "Directive 97/33/EC").
32 Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on
the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on Universal
Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, Eur. O.J. L101/24 (April 1,
1998) (hereinafter "Directive 98/10/EC").
33 Directive 97/33/EC, Article 2(l)(g), and Directive 98/10/EC, 2(2)(0 .
34 Directive 98/10/EC, Articles 5-8. See also Directive 97/33/EC, Annex I.
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The accomplishment of the liberalization process was, however,
not an end in itself. Indeed, due to its success there was a need for a
fresh regulatory approach that would reflect the new competitive
communications environment and the pronounced trends of
convergence and globalization.35 With the benefit of hindsight, one
can even say that the post-liberalization system proved to be a much
harder regulatory puzzle than the transition system, since it required
the establishment of a sustainable regulatory model. The 2002 EC
framework for electronic communications networks and services 36 was
the response to this need and attempted to meet the challenge. It
envisaged a few novel regulatory solutions, the most prominent of
which were: (i) the clear separation of network/transmission from
content in the regulatory structure; 37 (ii) the alignment of the sector-
35 The 1999 Communications Review, which was in essence the proposal of the European
Commission for a new regulatory framework for electronic communications, identified the
following issues that needed to be considered in the new regime: (i) convergence of
telecommunications, broadcasting, and information technology sectors; (ii) globalization of
technologies and markets; (iii) mergers and acquisitions changing the nature of the industry
and relationships between key players; (iv) the role of the Internet in overturning traditional
market structures and blurring the distinction between voice and data transmission; (v)
improvements in processing, access and basic technologies, in particular wave division
multiplexing on optical fibers and digital subscriber loops; (vi) the emergence of wireless
applications; (vii) software re-configurable technologies designed to meet the specific local
market requirements; and (viii) the development of new technologies within the media sector,
in particular digital TV. See European Commission, Towards a New Framework for
Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services: the 1999
Communications Review, COM(99) 537 final, 1999, 1-2.
36 See Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
Eur. O.J. L108/33 (April 24, 2002) (hereinafter the "Framework Directive"); Directive
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the
Authorization of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Eur. O.J. L108/21
(April 24, 2002); Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and
Associated Facilities, Eur. O.J. L108/7 (April 24, 2002); Directive 2002/22/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on Universal Service and Users'
Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Eur. O.J. L108/51
(April 24, 2002) (hereinafter the "Universal Service Directive"); Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, Eur.
O.J. L201/37 (April 24, 2002). See also Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September
2002 on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
Eur. O.J. L249/21 (Sept. 17, 2002) (hereinafter the "Commission Competition Directive").
37 The regime regulates only electronic communications services, electronic communications
networks, associated facilities, and associated services, as defined in Article 2 of the
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specific rules with the methodology and practice of EC antitrust,
including market-by-market sunset clauses triggering the withdrawal
of sectoral rules;33 and (iii)the introduction of the principle of
technological neutrality.
3 9
The 2002 package also featured a new Universal Service Directive
which remained true to the principles of equality, continuity, and
affordability and defined the scope of the USOs as encompassing:
(i) access location to the public telephone network; (ii) access to
publicly available telephone services at a fixed location to enable end-
users to make and receive local, national, and international telephone
calls, as well as facsimile and data communications; (iii) directory
services; (iv) public pay telephones; and (v) certain specific measures
for disabled users such as those with low income or special social
needs.4 °
If one compares the above USO definition with the pre-
liberalization USO scope previously outlined above, it is striking how
little has changed.4 1 The parameters of the USOs are practically the
same. Legitimate questions that arise are what has changed since the
liberalization? Have the introduction of competition and the "new"
telecom order changed anything at all? Most notably, these questions
will remain relevant even after the forthcoming review of the EC
communications regime that is to take place by the end of 2006,42
Framework Directive. Broadcasting content, financial services, and certain information
society services remain beyond its scope of application.
38 On the new mechanism for regulating dominance (the Significant Market Power regime),
see Articles 14-16 of the Framework Directive, supra note 36. See also Alexandre de Streel,
"The Integration of Competition Law Principles in the New European Regulatory Framework
for Electronic Communications," World Competition 26, no. 3 (2003): 489-514; Martin Cave,
"Economic Aspects of the New Regulatory Regime for Electronic Communications Service,"
in The Economics ofAntitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications, ed. Pierre A. Buigues
and Patrick Rey, 27-41 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004); Nihoul and Rodford, EU
Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 3.213-3.316.
39 Framework Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(1). See also Nihoul and Rodford, EU
Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 7.128-7.129.
40 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Articles 4-9.
41 If one carefully compares the two definitions, the only difference is the deletion of "fixed"
under point (i). There were no changes in practical terms either. See Economic Policy
Committee, Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2002, supra note 21, at 17.
42 European Commission, On the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, COM(06) 334 final, 2006.
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since despite the breadth of the discussions and the acknowledgement
of the transformed communications system, there are no projected
material changes to the USO.
43
C. INTERIM OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF UNIVERSAL
SERVICE
The situation outlined above may be described as a paradox where,
upon significant changes in both the regulated environment and the
regulation itself, a single institute, namely that of universal service,
remains intact. This paradox may be best explained by the politics
behind universal service conceptualization, or to put it radically, in the
words of Nicholas Garnham, that universal service rationale has been
"mobilised as an attempted defence of the telephone monopoly.'"4
Indeed, the "universal service" justification is still a strong political
argument, and one that enjoys surprisingly broad (almost automatic)
support even now that the liberalization exercise is complete. In
Switzerland, for instance, universal service was recently successfully
used as a defense of state control and against the withdrawal of the
Federal participation in the Swiss telecommunications incumbent.
45
Yet we argue that, although seemingly little has been altered, a few
key "ingredients" of the overall universal service policy have certainly
changed. First, in the context of competitive communications, there
are new tools for the provision of USOs. There is, above all, an
emphasis on the role of the market in the achievement of the defined
universal service objectives. The priority role of the market takes
different dimensions depending on the situation. In the EC context for
instance, member states are obliged to "determine the most efficient
43 European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome of the Review of the Scope of
Universal Service in Accordance with Article 15(2) of Directive 2002/22/EC, COM(06) 163
final, 2006, 5. Although the findings of the European Commission are that the scope of the
universal service should remain unchanged, it put forward for discussion some interesting
long-term issues related to the redefinition of the USOs (e.g. exclusion of public payphones
and directory services or separation of access to infrastructure from access to services).
44 Gamham, "Universal Service," supra note 19, at 200. See also Thomas Hart, "A Dynamic
Universal Service for a Heterogenous European Union," Telecommunications Policy 22, no.
10 (1998): 840; Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Competition in Telecommunications:
Munich Lectures in Economics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 218.
45 See, e.g., Christian Levrat, "Der Bund ist der richtige Swisscom-Aktionir" (The Federation
is the Right Swisscom Shareholder), Neue Zilrcher Zeitung (Dec. 2005); Swiss Federal
Council, Botschaft, supra note 21, at 3770.
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and appropriate approach for ensuring the implementation of universal
service, while respecting the principles of objectivity, transparency,
non-discrimination and proportionality '46 and to seek a minimization
of market distortions.47 Consequently, no market player is a priori
excluded from designation for provision of universal service,4 8 and all
undertakings present on the communications markets are eligible
under an efficient, objective, transparent, and non-discriminatory
designation mechanism. 49  Further, appointed operators must not
necessarily be nationals of the member state, and undertakings from
other geographic markets (e.g., U.S. or Swiss companies) or other
sectors (e.g., from the electricity industry5°) could enter the
designation procedures.
A second element added to the post-liberalization universal regime
that is linked to the above, but may also be considered distinctly, is its
built-in flexibility. For instance, EC member states may now
designate more than one undertaking, or designate different
undertakings or sets of undertakings, to provide different elements of
the universal service, or to cover different parts of the national
territory.5 1 This fragmentation of the mandate allows for competition
between undertakings in the provision of universal service and
therefore greater efficiency. In view of the inherent dynamism of
communications, the flexibility of the new EC rezime is further
ensured by the periodic review of the scope of USO. The review is
to be undertaken "in the light of social, economic and technological
developments, taking into account, inter alia, mobility and data rates
in the light of the prevailing technologies used by the majority of
46 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 3(2).
47 Ibid.; see also Commission Competition Directive, supra note 36, at Article 6.
48 Contrary to the previous regime. See Article 4(c)(1) of Commission Directive 90/388 on
Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Services, Eur. O.J. L192/10 (July 24,
1990); Directive 97/33/EC, Article 5(1).
49 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(2).
50 See European Commission, "High-speed Internet Access via the Electricity Grid:Commission Seeks to Create New Market Opportunities," Press Release IP/05/403, Brussels,
April 8, 2005. See also European Commission, Draft Commission Recommendation of 6
April 2005 on Broadband Electronic Communications through Powerlines, C(05) 1031, 2005.
51 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 8(1).
52 See Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 15(1).
2007]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
subscribers." 53 The review process could thus, accounting for new
developments in society in terms of needs for and spread of
technologies, and considering the developments in technology itself,
adjust the parameters of universal service at the EC level.54
On a more general level, a third conclusion that could be drawn
from the development of EC communications law is that the generic
benefits of competition, i.e., the 5 5pure economic rationales of
competition for achieving efficiency, have come to the forefront. As
already mentioned, this means in essence that the overall thrust of the
EC liberalization model is upon the market. This "economic turn,,,
56
reflecting the conventional Western economies' wisdom is, however,
to be seen together with a certain "public turn," whereby certain public
interest objectives are clearly defined and pursued.57
In conclusion, we suggest that there has been some readjustment.
However, we cannot exaggerate its magnitude: it is just a "bunny-hop"
and not a giant leap. Besides the realization that communications
markets, the technology, and the needs of the consumers have
changed, the concept of universal service remains relatively sticky and
there has been no real breakthrough in the pre-liberalization thinking.
While the talks on the new nature of universal service and the need for
adaptation have been going on for more than ten years, 58 both in
53 Universal Service Directive, supra note 36, at Article 15(2). See also Annex V thereof.
54 See European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43, at 6.
55 The consumer welfare approach sees competition as ensuring allocative, productive, and
dynamic efficiency in the economy. Collectively, these generic benefits of competition
provide maximization of wealth at the lowest possible cost to society, the consumer being the
ultimate beneficiary of the competitive market forces.
56 On the economic turn of EC competition law, for instance, see Mel Kenny, The
Transformation of Public and Private EC Competition Law (Berne: Staempfli, 2002), 101-
218. See also Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP), "DG Competition
Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,"
EAGCP Report for DG COMP (July 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
others/discpaper2005.pdf (accessed October 1, 2006).
57 A similar "public turn" observation has been made by Herbert Burkert in the context of EC
telecommunications policy. See Herbert Burkert, "The Post-Deregulatory Landscape in
International Telecommunications Law: A Unique European Union Approach," Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 27, no. 3 (2002): 739-816.
58 See, e.g., Robert H. Anderson et al., Universal Access to E-mail: Feasibility and Societal
Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995); Blackman, "Universal Service," supra note
1, at 171-175.
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academia and policy circles, they have largely remained just talks.
Policymakers have stuck to the classical paradigm of universal service,
but the solutions offered are barely sustainable and begin "to look
increasingly like 'band-aid' solutions that cover up the internal
contradictions." 59 In the following sections, we argue that a more
radical readjustment is needed that relates, above all, to the concept of
universal service.
III. READJUSTING THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE DEBATE
For readjusting the focus of the universal service debate we
suggest that one should not equate the universal service rejimes
(previous, current, or future) with the societal goals behind USO. "It
is important to understand [...] history and how, at different stages of
development of telecommunications networks, universal service will
have different meanings and emphases."61 Upon closer examination
of these different stages,62 it is apparent that, although the meaning of
universal service and how it is pursued vary, there is "an underlying
unity of aim." 63 Equity, continuity, and affordability certainly remain
as its defining principles. They are, however, not ends in themselves,
but must be seen in the broad context of state intervention and the
public interest. In this context, they reflect the major justifications of
public intervention in the economy, in particular market failures and
redistributive considerations. Historically these validations stem from
the service public tradition, which is well established in all European
59 Jayakar & Sawhney, "Universal Service," supra note 6, at 346.
60 See, e.g., Milton L. Mueller, "Universal Service Policies as wealth Distribution,"
Government Information Quarterly 16, No. 4 (1999): 353-358; Garnham, "Universal
Service," supra note 19, at 199-204.
61 Blackman, "Universal Service," supra note 1, at 172. See also Jayakar and Sawhney,
"Universal Service," supra note 6, at 341-342.
62 Claire Milne, "Stages of Universal Service Policy," Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 9
(1998): 776.
63 Ibid., 777. Claire Milne identifies the following common elements: (i) universal service is
desired for social or political reasons and includes a notion of "equity;" (ii) achievement of
universal service is apparently not commercially viable; (iii) it is recognized that definitions
will change as society and technology change; (iv) definitions cover what are seen as "basic
telecom services" i.e., well established, relatively cheap, and very important to ordinary
people; (v) adequate quality of service is defined or understood; and (vi) service must be
affordable by those for whom it is designed.
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countries64 and linked to the notion of citizenship. 65  While the
institute of universal service is more limited in scope than that of
public service and does not address considerations like the long-term
impact of investment decisions or environmental effects, it does
contribute to the achievement of certain "public service" objectives.
These can be broadly summarized under three categories:
(i) internalization of network externalities; (ii) redistribution between
users (of different locations and/or income groups); and (iii) the
realization of some public goods (such as an all-encompassing
communications network).66 We advocate in this line construing
universal service as a tool for the achievement of the societal goals
within the above triangle of economic and welfare goals, and not as a
goal in itself, simply equated to a "telephone in every home."
67
A second element of the readjustment exercise is the realization
that universal service is a dynamic concept prone to evolution68 and
could accommodate, depending on the political environment, different
concrete sub-objectives framed within the above value-triangle.69 We
can thus think of it as an "empty" concept that may (and hopefully
will) be filled in the future with content other than telephony. 70 This is
not to say that regulators cannot be pragmatic. On the contrary, the
flexibility of the universal service concept allows the construction of
supplier hybrid models. Universal service policies would still be
constrained by the recognition that USOs must be specifically defined
64 See, e.g., Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law, supra note 15.
65 See ibid., 28-38, 102-106; Nihoul and Rodford, supra note 5, at 5.319. See also Giuliano
Amato, "Citizenship and Public Services: Some General Reflections," in Public Services and
Citizenship in European Law, ed. Mark Freedland and Silvana Sciarra (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 145-156.
66 European Commission, "Liberalisation of Network Industries," supra note 2, at 170.
67 See Blackman, "Universal Service," supra note 1. A similar, albeit more radical, "'zero-
based policy" approach is suggested by Pisciotta. See Aileen Amarandos Pisciotta, "Telecom
Policy for Information Economies: Unregulation Is Not Enough," in Networking Knowledge
for Information Society: Institutions and Intervention, ed. Robin Mansell, Rohan Samarajva,
and Amy Mahan (Delft: DUP Science 2002), 88.
6
' Nihoul and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.78.
69 For a critique of the possibility for pursuit of other political objectives, see Mueller,
"Universal Service Policies as Wealth Distribution," supra note 60; Garnharn, "Universal
Service," supra note 19, at 199-204.
70 See, e.g., "Hearing Voices," The Economist (October 28, 2004): 21-23.
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and targeted, transparent, cost-effective, and competitively and
technologically neutral.7'
A third element of the shift in the universal service discussion,
which is logically interlinked with the previous issue, relates to the
need to understand the profound changes in the communications
environment, where universal service policies are to be implemented.
In the next section we briefly elaborate upon the new nature of the
communications system and cautiously draw the contours of a fitting
concept of universal service in a digital networked communications
environment that emphasizes the "public good' dimension of
communication and information networks.
IV. THE NEW CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN A DIGITAL
NETWORKED COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT
As we have already mentioned, the telecommunications sector has
changed. However, these changes have not been confined within the
boundaries of the sector. The evolution of electronic communications
and "the continuing development of new technologies for the
transmission and storage of information [have led] to organisational,
commercial, technical and legal innovations that are having a profound
impact on society in general.",72 Furthermore, "[a]s the use of ICT
[information and communication technology] grows, so does its
impact on society., 73 Thus, both the quantitative and the qualitative
ICT-based ramifications are clearly immense. If, however, we wish to
observe the changes in the "big picture" and talk of Information
Society as a general societal phenomenon, it would be rather
superficial (and largely untrue) to relate its creation and development
solely to the advances in ICTs.74 We should take into account the
71 OECD, "Rethinking Universal Service for a Next Generation Network Environment,"
Report of the Working Party on Communication and Information Services Policies,
DST/ICCP/TISP(2005)5/final (April 18, 2006).
72 Council of the European Union, "Council Resolution on the Consumer Dimension of the
Information Society," Eur. O.J. C23/1 (Jan. 28, 1999), at Recital 1.
13 European Commission, i2010 - A European Information Society for Growth and
Employment, COM(05) 229 final (June 1, 2005), 9.
74 "The Information Technology Revolution DID NOT create the network society. But
without technology, the Network Society would not exist." Manuel Castells, "An Introduction
to the Information Age," in The Information Society Reader, ed. Frank Webster (London:
Routledge, 2004), 139 (upper case in the original).
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wider social, political, and cultural processes that have led (and
continue to lead) to the networked, knowledge-based environment in
which we live.
Although it is almost commonplace now to speak of the
Information Society,75 there is no single and universally accepted
theory of its nature and characteristics. Instead of attempting an
examination of all the theories,76 we shall use a simplified "working"
definition of the Information Society, with emphases on its spatial and
cultural aspects77  and their implications for communications
regulation. With this caveat in mind, we can define Information
Society as a society in which the creation, distribution, and
manipulation of information 78  has become the most significant
economic and cultural activity. In its spatial aspect, the Information
Society could then be construed as information networks, "which
connect locations and in consequence have dramatic effects on the
organisation of time and space."79  These effects could be seen as
stemming from both the globalization of marketplaces 80 and from the
75 The concept of "Information Society" allegedly came into being some forty years ago: the
economist Fritz Machlup, while examining the U.S. patent system postulated the existence of
a "knowledge economy" and stressed the role of information. See Fritz Machlup, The
Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1962).
76 See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting
(1973; repr., New York: Basic Books, 1999); Manuel Castells, The Information Age:
Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell,
2000). For a critique, see Nicholas Garnham, "Information Society Theory as Ideology: A
Critique," Studies in Communications Sciences 1 (2001): 129-166. For an overview of the
different theories, see Frank Webster, Theories of Information Society (London: Routledge,
1995); Frank Webster, ed., The Information Society Reader (London: Routledge, 2004). See
also Alistair S. Duff, Information Society Studies (London: Routledge, 2001); Christopher
May, The Information Society: A Sceptical View (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
77 Building upon the analysis of Frank Webster, who identifies five definitions of an
Information Society, namely: (i) technological; (ii) economic; (iii) occupational; (iv) spatial
and (v) cultural. See Webster, Theories of Information Society, supra note 77, at 6-10.
78 That is information also in the sense of knowledge. See William H. Dutton, Social
Transformation in an Information Society: Rethinking Access to You and the World (Paris:
UNESCO, 2004), 27.
79 Webster, Theories ofInformation Society, supra note 76, at 18.
go On globalization (in particular economic globalization), see Peter van den Bossche, The
Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 3-21. For an excellent collection of contributions on globalization, see David Held and
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technologies allowing instant communications and data transfer, which
result ultimately in a "shrinking world."''4 These "time/space
compressions"8 2 have multiple repercussions and most notably in our
context lead to increasing interconnectedness within the information
networks. The emergence of all-encompassing global networks
underlines at the same time the significance of the flow of
information,83 i.e., the content that is spread through them. The global
reach and technological potency of the infrastructures have allowed
for vast amounts of information to be disseminated. Now that
digitization has become ubiquitous, all types of content (audio, video,
or text) expressed in ones and zeros can be distributed over any
network (telephone, cable, or mobile) at the speed of light. New forms
of communication are emerging (e.g., weblogs84 or online social
networking platforms8s ) and these developments, taken together, are
leading to a fundamental shift in the traditional channels of content
distribution.
8 6
Anthony McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2003).
s1 See "The Shrinking World: The Impact of Transportation Technology on Effective
Distance" in Anthony G. Oettinger, "Information Technologies, Government and Governance:
Some Insights from History," (Incidental Paper, Program on Information Resources Policy,
Harvard University, September 1998), http://www.pirp.harvard.edu (accessed October 1,
2006). See also John B. Thompson, "The Globalization of Communication," in Held and
McGrew, The Global Transformations Reader, supra note 81, 246-259.
82 As referred to by Anthony Giddens. See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity:
Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). On the "Age of
Simultaneity," see, e.g., Neal M. Rosendorf, "Social and Cultural Globalization: Concepts,
History, and America's Role," in Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and
John D. Donahue (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 109-134.
83 Webster, Theories of Information Society, supra note 76, at 19, referring to Manuel Castells,
The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban
Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
84 See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People,
Sebastopol (CA: O'Reilly Media, 2004). See also PEW Internet & American Life Project,
"Bloggers: A Portrait of the Internet's Storytellers," July 19, 2006,
http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006).
85 See, e.g., "MySpace," http://www.myspace.com; see also "Facebook,"
http://www.facebook.com.
6 See, e.g., "Net Dreams: Traditional Media Companies Are Making a Huge Push onto the
Internet," The Economist (March 16, 2006): 61-62.
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The means of distribution have accordingly changed the content
being distributed. The emergence of transnational communication
conglomerates as key players in the global system of communication
and information diffusion 7 has led to a transformation of the type and
variety of content being distributed. Formats and contents of
television programs, films, and shows have become increasingly
homogeneous. Although this "uniformization" of content does not
necessarily mean a cultural wasteland,8 9 it does lead to us being faced
with a completely altered media and communications environment9°
- an environment that has the potential to acutely affect our culture.91
To use the words of Manuel Castells,
[flor all the science fiction ideology and commercial hype
surrounding the emergence of the so-called 'information
superhighway,' we can hardly underestimate its significance.
The potential integration of text, images, and sounds in the
same system, interacting from multiple points, in chosen
time (real and delayed) along a global network, in conditions
of open and affordable access, does fundamentally change
the character of communication. And communication
decisively shapes culture, because, as Postman writes, 'we
87 See, e.g., Robert W. McChesney, "The New Global Media," in Held and McGrew, The
Global Transformations Reader, supra note 80, at 278-285; Christoph Beat Graber, Handel
und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht der WTO. Vdlkerrechtliche, 6konomische und
kulturpolitische Grundlagen einer globalen Medienordnung (Berne: Staempfli, 2003), 45-50.
8 8 For a critique of the cultural industries and on the homogeneity of content, see Graber,
Handel undKultur, supra note 88, at 18-21.
89 See, e.g., Herbert Schiller, "Striving for Communication Dominance: A Half-Century
Review," in Electronic Empires: Global Media and Local Resistance, ed. Daya Kishan
Thussu (London: Edward Arnold, 1998), 17-26.
90 John B. Thompson, "The Globalization of Communication," in Held and McGrew, The
Global Transformations Reader, supra note 80, at 246-259. Thompson suggests notably that,
"the appropriation of globalized symbolic materials involves [...] the accentuation of symbolic
distancing from the spatial-temporal contexts of everyday life." Ibid., 256 (emphasis in the
original). See also Graber, Handel und Kultur, supra note 87, at 22-27.
91 Castells, The Information Age, supra note 76, at 357 (emphasis added). For a
comprehensive analysis of the concept of culture, see Graber, Handel undKultur, supra note
87, at 11-36. See also Nicholas Garrham, Emancipation, the Media, and Modernity:
Arguments about the Media and Social Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 140-
164; Anthony D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture," in Held and McGrew, The Global
Transformations Reader, supra note 80, 278-285.
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do not see ... reality ... as 'it' is, but as our languages are.
And our languages are our media. Our media are our
metaphors. Our metaphors create the content of our
culture.' 
92
As a conclusion to the above account of some implications of the
Information Society, we identify two points of significance in our
specific context. First, communications should be thought of not only
as "transmission systems,"93 but also in terms of their special role as
channels carrying and disseminating information and content. Second,
it must be acknowledged that changes in the telecommunications
industry induce profound socio-economic changes and that these two
sets of changes are interdependent.
94
Against the complex background, noted above, we should now try
to apply our "empty concept" of universal service. This exercise is in
line with the approach suggested by Jayakar and Sawhney of
examining universal service options in terms of a possibility space,
where policy innovations can take place. 95 In that sense, our "objective
is not so much to identify a list of possible instruments, but to expose
our self-imposed boundaries and to suggest new possibilities for
universal service."
96
92 Castells, The Information Age, supra note 76, at 356, referring to Neil Postman, Amusing
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Penguin,
1985), 15 (abridged in the original). See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1999), http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5740 (accessed
October. 1, 2006) (he famously noted, at 5.6, that: "The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world" (in the original: "Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner
Welt")).
93 Framework Directive, supra note 36, at Article 2(a).
94 Knud Erik Skouby, "Information Societies: Toward a More Useful Concept," in Mansell,
Samarajva, and Mahan, eds., Networking Knowledge, supra note 7, at 176, referring to the
work of William H. Melody. See, e.g., William H. Melody, "Technological, Economic and
Institutional Aspects of Computer/Telecommunications Systems," in OECD, Applications of
Computer/Telecommunications Systems (Paris: OECD, 1975); William H. Melody,
"Identifying Priorities for Building Distinct Information Societies," The Economic and Social
Review 28, no. 3 (1996): 177-184; William H. Melody, "Policy Research in the Information
Society," in Information and Communication Technologies: Visions and Realities, ed.
William H. Dutton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 303-317; William H. Melody,
"Human Capital in Information Economies," New Media and Society 1, no. 1 (1999): 39-46.
95 Jayakar and Sawhney, "Universal Service," supra note 6, at 340 (emphasis added). For an
excellent overview of the emerging of proposals, see ibid., 351-354.
96Ibid., 340.
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A. BEYOND THE TELEPHONE
As telecommunication networks reach saturation, as multimedia
platforms proliferate, and as the concept of scarcity is being
reformulated, it is clear that universal access in the form of POTS
(plain old telephone service) is becoming inadequate. While some
hold that universal service policies should simply be abolished,97 a
strong group of voices is calling for a "next generation" universal
service, albeit they are doing so with little coherence.98
The importance of "being connected" to a network as a means of
communication is likely to remain unchanged,99 or may even increase
in response to the more intensive interconnectedness and its value in
the Information Society. We deem however competitive
telecommunications markets as sufficient to guarantee the ubiquity of
and inclusion in the network. The POTS definition of USO will be,
pursuant to the principles of technological and network neutrality,
reformulated as "access to networks," rather than access to particular
services.100 The stress within the triangle of equality, continuity, and
affordability is likely to shift towards the last of the three values.
Beyond the internalizing and redistributional considerations, in the
context of increasing the value of the communications network as a
public good, there may be a need to re-think the accessibility and
functionality of networks.' 0 ' "First mile"10 2 issues, in the sense of how
97 See, e.g., Roberta G. Lentz, "The E-volution of the Digital Divide in the US: A Mayhem of
Competing Metrics," info 2, no. 4 (2000): 355-377; Benjamin M. Compaine, "Information
Gaps: Myth or Reality?" in The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating a Myth?, ed.
Benjamin M. Compaine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 105-118.
98 Jayakar and Sawhney, "Universal Service," supra note 6, at 340.
99 On the social and economic effects of being connected, see Benjamin M. Compaine and
Mitchell J. Weinraub, "Universal Access to Online Services; An Examination of the Issue,"
Telecommunications Policy 21, no. 1 (1997): 15-33, referring also to Ithiel de Sola Pool, The
Social Impact of the Telephone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977); Ithiel de Sola Pool,
Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology Assessment of the Telephone
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1983). See also European Commission, "Liberalisation of Network
Industries," supra note 2, at 172-176.
'00 A proposal that was also considered by the European Commission. See European
Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43, at 6.
101 Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell, "An End to Disabling Policies?: Towards
Enlightened Universal Service," The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 127-133.
" A phrase used by Sharon Strover. See Sharon Strover, "The First Mile," The Information
Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 151-154.
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connectivity is perceived from the subscriber's perspective, could also
become essential. Connectivity in this broader sense may encapsulate
network interface devices, software and training, as well as incentives
to create content and contribute to the community. It corresponds to
the implications of the contemporary Information Society as
elaborated in the preceding section. In this context and going beyond
the telephone, we consider two elements as particularly critical for the
future shape of universal service policies. These are innovation and
content and are outlined below.
B. INNOVATION
There is a three-way connection between innovation 10 4 and
universal service. First, innovation and the resulting technological
advances in telecommunications "reduce the cost and accelerate the
timescale of progress towards universal services goals, which tends to
be a slow and costly process."' 10 5 Second, innovation "affects the ways
individuals and households organize their lives, and the ways
government and business conduct their activities."'106  Some
technologies, such as digitization, as we have argued above, may
trigger processes that go beyond the availability of more gadgets and
profoundly change the face of the industry and our lives. In that sense,
innovation instigates the formulation of new contents for universal
service, since "innovations in telecommunication services affect the
specific meaning that people attach to the concept of universal service,
so that kinds of telecommunication service now regarded as
necessities [...] include features that were previously considered to be
luxuries."' 0 7 This stresses the need for constant awareness of the
103 Ibid.; On the importance of training, see, e.g., Sharon Eisner Gillett, "Universal Service:
Defining the Policy Goal in the Age of the Internet," The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000):
147-149.
104 Innovation is understood here in its broadest meaning of research and development,
invention and creation of new technologies, products and services (endogenous innovation), as
well as the adoption of these by the relevant markets (exogenous innovation).
'
05Michael Tyler, William Letwin, and Christopher Roe, "Universal Service and Innovation in
Telecommunication Services," Telecommunications Policy 19, no. 1 (1995): 3-20; Ibid., 18.
106 Ibid., 19. See also PEW Internet & American Life Project, Internet Penetration and
Impact (April 26, 2006), http://,www.pewintemet.org/ (accessed October. 1, 2006).
107 Tyler, Letwin, and Roe, "Universal Service and Innovation," supra note 105, at 3. Mobile
telephony is a lucid example in this regard.
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dynamism of universal service, which in practical terms means
providing for mechanisms for reviewing the scope of USOs, as the
example of the EC universal service regime shows. 10 8
Third, and more unusually, USOs could be seen as a driver of
innovation. 10 9  Increasingly endowed with a critical role in modem
economies, innovation is linked to the goal of governments to achieve
sustainability. 110 As the history of the telecommunications industrv
reveals, innovation has been its driving force from the outset. i n
Furthermore, communications markets exhibit network effects,112
which make the innovation cycle uneven, since the adoption of a
certain technology by the end-users is highly dependent on their
expectations of the size of the future network. Under such
circumstances, the demand for, and the adoption of, new technologies
which are an essential part of the innovation process, could be
predetermined by the lock-in effects1 13 of existing large networks (the
108 See European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43.
109 Frangois Bar and Annemarie Munk Riis, "From Welfare to Innovation: Toward a New
Rationale for Universal Service" (Conference Paper, the 26th Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference, Alexandria, VA, October 3-5, 1998), http://tprc.org/agenda98.htm
(accessed July 11, 2006). See also Frangois Bar and Annemarie Munk Riis, "Tapping User-
Driven Innovation: A New Rationale for Universal Service," The Information Society 16, no.
2 (2000): 99-108.
110 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Alexander Wagner, and Gernot Wagner, "Interpreting
Sustainability in Economic Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity"
(Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2002-02, Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, May 2002). See also Marc Bourreau and Pinar
Dogan, "Regulation and Innovation in the Telecommunications Industry,"
Telecommunications Policy 25, no. 3 (2001): 167-168.
11 For evidence, see Knut Blind, et al., "New Products and Services: Analysis of Regulations
Shaping New Markets," Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Research Study funded
by the European Commission (Karlsruhe, February 2004), 76; Bourreau and Dogan,
"Regulation and Innovation," supra note 111, at 169.
112 On network effects, see Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, "Network
Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, no. 2 (1994): 1-
26; Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, "Are Network Externalities a New Source
of Market Failure?" Research in Law and Economics 17 (1995): 1-22; Carl Shapiro and Hal
R. Varian, Information Rules (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999); Nicholas
Economides, "The Economics of Networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization
16, no. 4 (1996): 673-699; Heli Koski and Tobias Kretschmer, "Survey on Competing in
Network Industries: Firm Strategies, Market Outcomes, and Policy Implications," Journal of
Industry, Competition and Trade (Bank Papers) (2004): 5-31.
113 Victor Stango defines a "lock-in" as "a situation in which economic agents' equilibrium
decisions regarding standards adoption yield lower social welfare than an alternative." See
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.. ... 114most notorious example of which is the Windows operating system ).
A path dependent of adoption 115 emerges in that regard, which is
difficult to overcome (including in a case of availability of a superior
technology 116) and influences the stimuli for innovation. In that
context, universal service policy could "foster linked objectives ' ' 17
and "stimulate the creation of a broad-based society of lay users for
advanced ICT, whose participation in successful interaction with
suppliers is key to the breadth of the ICT innovation process [...]
increas[ing] the total range and number of information technology
innovations and at the same time decreas[ing] the proportion of
'unsatisfactory innovations.""' 18 To put it simply, this means that the
government can either stimulate the adoption of certain technologies(which is, however, not technologically neutral) or may increase the
awareness and the knowledge as to how available and/or new
advanced technologies could be applied. This would also contribute to
the various governmental projects on Information Society linked to the
instrumentalization of ICTs for the achievement of a variety of public
interest goals, such as inclusion, growth, and improved public
services.
Victor Stango, "The Economics of Standards Wars," Review of Network Economics 1, no. 1
(2004): 4. See also Shapiro and Varian, Information Rules, supra note 113, at 103-171.
114 See Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, COM(04) 900 final and Order of the
President of the Court of First Instance, Proceedings for interim relief- Article 82 EC in Case
T-201/04 R Microsoft v. Commission of the European Communities (Dec. 22, 2004), Eur. O.J.
C69/16 (March 19, 2005).
15 Stango, "The Economics of Standards Wars," supra note 113, at 5.
116 See, e.g., Paul A. David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic
Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-337; Paul A. David, "Path Dependence and the Quest for
Historical Economics: One More Chorus of the Ballad of QWERTY," University of Oxford
Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, no. 20 (1997).
117 A phrase used by Tyler and Letwin and Roe in "Universal Service and Innovation in
Telecommunication Services," supra note 106.
'18 Bar and Riis, "From Welfare to Innovation," supra note 109, at 17.
119 Such types of project are prominent in the European regulatory space (for the current
project, see European Commission, i2010- A European Information Society for Growth and
Employment, supra note 73), but not exclusively European (see, e.g., Castells, The
Information Age, supra note 76, at 394-395).
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C. ACCESS TO CONTENT
Besides the newly formulated tasks of universal service in terms of
access to networks and innovation, we argue that in the longer-term
evolution of the Information Society, the idea of universal access will
need to be extended to include content. This may have different
dimensions. One dimension may address access to basic information,
such as certain kinds of public information regarding health
education, transportation, or government informational resources.126
In the context of ongoing and increasing convergence 121 between the
telecommunications and media sectors, it may also be essential to
consider the possibilities of addressing universal service issues in
these domains simultaneously. 122  However in acknowledgin the
difference between information and communication resources, one
should not overstate the issues related to access to information. As
Compaine and Weinraub lucidly point out,
[a]lthough news about the society around them is considered
by many to be vital to every voting citizen in a democratic
society, here too there has never been a serious movement to
subsidize a newspaper on every doorstep or a radio on every
kitchen table. In this case, most societies have chosen to
120 See Robin Mansell, "Designing Networks to Capture Customers: Policy and Regulation
Issues for the New Telecom Environment," in Melody, "Policy Objectives and Models of
Regulation," supra note 18, at 85-86.
121 On convergence, see Colin R. Blackman, "Convergence between Telecommunications and
Other Media," Telecommunications Policy 22, no. 3 (1998): 163-170; P.H. Longstaff, "New
Ways to Think about the Visions Called 'Convergence': A Guide for Business and Public
Policy," Program on Information Resources Policy (Harvard University, April 2000); OECD,
The Implications of Convergence for Regulation of Electronic Communications,
DSTIIICCP/TISP(2003)5/final (July 12, 2004); Damien Geradin and David Luff, eds., The
WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio- Visual Services
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Milton L. Mueller, "Convergence: A Reality
Check," in The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio- Visual
Services, ed. Damien Geradin and David Luff, 311-322; Pierre Larouche, "Dealing with
Convergence at the International Level," in The W'TO and Global Convergence in
Telecommunications andAudio- Visual Services, ed. Damien Geradin and David Luff, 390-
422.
122 See Simpson, "Universal Service Issues," supra note 19.
123 Compaine and Weinraub, "Universal Access to Online Services," supra note 99, at 32-33.
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post the daily newspaper in a public space, either in the town
center or the public library.
124
In that sense, following our previous elaborations and the suggestions
by Harmeet Sawhney, hybrid models may be created where uniform
solutions are formulated for resources used in the communication
mode, while a segmented approach is applied for resources in the
information access mode.
1 25
An arguably more vital dimension of access relates to the broader
context of human rights and, in particular, to the freedom of
expression. 126 As we have argued above, in the Information Society,
information has become the single most important element.
Therefore, greater participation in the production and processing of
information needs to be expedited. For instance, the latest Pew
Internet Report shows that as of March 2006 forty-two percent of all
American adults had a high-speed Internet connection at home, 127 and
thirty-five percent of all Internet users have posted content there, the
large majority of them being home broadband users. 128 Following this
line of reasoning, we argue that there is a new type of participatory
culture emerging 29 and it is crucial that a certain minimum of access
is provided for all. This relates not only to freedom of expression as a
124 Ibid., 31.
125 Harmeet Sawhney, "Universal Service: Separating the Grain of Truth from the Proverbial
Chaff," The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 161-164.
126 The right of freedom of opinion and expression is safeguarded in the majority of national
constitutions. On the international level, it is formulated in Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA Resolution 217 A(iii), UN Doc.A/810 (December 10,
1948), as including "freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." It is reiterated in
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200
A(xxi), UN Doc.A/6316 (1966), thereby making it binding to the parties. As of September
19, 2006, 157 countries were parties to the Covenant.
127 Which is a 40 percent increase in numbers of Americans with high-speed Internet
(compared to the 30 percent growth of 2005).
128 See PEW Internet & American Life Project, "Home Broadband Adoption 2006," (May 28,
2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed October 1, 2006).
129 See, e.g., Urs Gasser and Silke Ernst, "From Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A Quick
Look at Copyright and User Creativity in the Digital Age," Berkman Center for Internet and
Society Research Publication, no. 2006-05 (June 2006). See also PEW Internet & American
Life Project, supra note 84.
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fundamental right that in its institutional aspect 130 needs to be secured
by the state, but also to freedom of expression as guaranteeing and
enabling cultural diversity, 131 the protection of which is critical in light
of the implications of the changed communications environment
sketched above. 132  The so-construed "access to content" is distinct
from the conventional question of whether USOs should include
broadband. 133  Although the inclusion of broadband in the scope of
USOs allowing unlimited access to the Internet will clearly facilitate
access to content, the mere availability and affordability of broadband
does not exhaust the issues of access to content in the above-
mentioned contexts of access to public information and cultural
diversity.
130 Graber, Handel undKultur, supra note 87, at 100.
131 See Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, adopted at the 33rd Session of the General Conference of UNESCO
(October 20, 2005). On cultural diversity, see, e.g., Joost Smiers, Arts under Pressure (New
York: Zed Books, 2004); the collection of contributions in Christoph Beat Graber, Michael
Girsberger, and Mira Nenova, eds., Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity (Zurich: Schulthess,
2004); Christoph Beat Graber, "The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity: A
Counterbalance to the WTO?" Journal of International Economic Law 9, no. 3 (2006): 553-
574.
132 "Freedom of expression, media pluralism, multilingualism, equal access to art and to
scientific and technological knowledge, including in digital form, and the possibility for all
cultures to have access to the means of expression and dissemination are the guarantees of
cultural diversity." See Article 2(1) of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra note 132.
133 See, e.g., European Commission, Report Regarding the Outcome, supra note 43.
Currently, in the EC, although universal service includes a connection to the public telephone
network at a fixed location, this requirement is limited to a single narrowband network
connection, the provision of which may be restricted by member states to the end-user's
primary location/residence and does not extend to the Integrated Services Digital Network
(ISDN). Connections to the public telephone network (wired or wireless) at a fixed location
should however be capable of supporting speech and data communications at rates sufficient
for access to online services, such as those provided via the public Internet. The speed of
Internet access experienced by a given user may depend on a number of factors, including the
provider(s) of Internet connectivity, as well as the given application for which a connection is
being used. The data rate that can be supported by a single narrowband connection to the
public telephone network depends on the capabilities of the subscriber's terminal equipment,
as well as the connection. For this reason, the EC has not mandated a specific data or bit rate
at the Community level. In specific cases, where the connection to the public telephony
network is clearly insufficient to support satisfactory Internet access, member states should be
able to require the connection to be brought up to the level enjoyed by the majority of
subscribers so that it supports data rates sufficient for access to the Internet. See Universal
Service Directive, supra note 36, at Recital 8.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Universal service programs are not outdated and remain necessary
in the digital networked environment. Past rationales for universal
service policies were based primarily on welfare and network
externalities. In the new communications system, however, there are
new justifications and a new potential for universal service packages.
This does not mean that universal service should be simply expanded
beyond POTS to include PANS (pretty amazing new stuff). This
would be contrary to the fundamental notion of universal service as
resting upon the principles of equality, continuity, and affordability
and stemming from the fundamental rights of the citizens. We deem it
most important in the discussions of future universal service models to
go back to precisely these underlying ideas and let go of the telephony
legacy, which is heavily loaded with lobbyists' arguments and is
becoming increasingly inadequate. The conceptualization of
communications and information networks as a public good could be
of particular importance in the debates of universal service - citizens
are to be thought of not only as consumers but also members of the
political society.1
34
We should be pragmatic, however, and not expect brave new USO
models. "In fact, there are many reasons favoring a go slow policy
that involves economics, the rate of technological change, and political
reality. 1 35 The question of who pays will also certainly remain core
to the discussion, although one should not equate the benefits of
universal service policy with its costs.
136
During the debates that will ultimately lead to the political will for
transforming the contents and/or mechanisms of universal service, it is
vital that the developments within the communications sector
134 Mark Freedland, "Law, Public Services, and Citizenship - New Domains, New Regimes?"
in Public Services and Citizenship, ed. Freedland and Sciarra, supra note 65, at 8-11.
135 Compaine and Weinraub, "Universal Access to Online Services," supra note 99, at 27. Eli
Skogerbe and Tanja Storsul, for instance, analyze telecommunications policies in Denmark,
the Netherlands, and Norway and show that business actors are well networked and are
pressing for a minimal definition of universal service, while actors supporting an extended
definition are less coordinated and less successful. The authors conclude that it is unlikely
that universal services will be defined more extensively in the future. See Eli Skogerbo and
Tanja Storsul, "Prospects for Expanded Universal Service in Europe: The Cases of Denmark,
the Netherlands, and Norway," The Information Society 16, no. 2 (2000): 135-146.
'36 See European Commission, "Liberalisation of Network Industries," supra note 2, at 176-
178.
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(technologies, market restructuring, and private actors' actions 137) and
within the broader Information Society as complex adaptive systems1 38
are vigilantly observed. While market forces should be given priority,
the potential of universal service as a tool of state intervention for
safeguarding pubic interest objectives in increasingly deregulated
communications markets should be appropriately assessed.1
3 9
137 For instance, Google's role in providing wireless access to Internet (Wi-Fi) in the city of
San Francisco. See "Google Offers San Francisco Wi-Fi for Free: Company's Bid Is One of
Many in Response to Mayor's Call for Universal Online Access," San Francisco Chronicle,
October 1, 2005. See also Robin Finn, "A Visionary Seeking to Connect the World,
Wirelessly," The New York Times, July 14, 2006.
138 On communications as a complex adaptive system, see P.H. Longstaff, The
Communications Toolkit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 16 et seq.; P.H. Longstaff,
"Competition in the Communications Sector: Can Predictability Be Regulated" (Program on
Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, April 2003), 14 et seq.,
http://www.pirp.harvard.edu (accessed October 1, 2006); P.H. Longstaff, "The Puzzle of
Competition in the Communications Sector: Can Complex Systems be Regulated or
Managed?" (Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, July 2003), 15-
17, 20 et seq., http://www.pirp.harvard.edu (accessed October 1, 2006).
139 In that context, universal service could be an advantageous way of preserving a certain
layer of regulation for achieving economic and societal objectives. In the framework of EC
law, for instance, universal service is undoubtedly better suited than "services of general
economic interest," which is arguably another instrument that could be applied for the
achievement of public interest goals. Notably, in contrast to "services of general economic
interest," universal service involves no derogation from EC or national competition rules and
thus remains within the market mechanism. See EC Treaty, Article 86(2). See also Nihoul
and Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law, supra note 5, at 5.265-5.336; Vito
Aurucchio, "Services of General Economic Interest and the Application of EC Competition
Law," World Competition 24, no. 1 (2001): 65-91; Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law,
supra note 15, at 125-141.
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